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INTRODUCTION 
The decision in Ivers v. Utah Dep 't of Transp, 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, 
constitutes a marked departure from Utah's constitutional mandate that "just 
compensation" be paid when private property is "taken or damaged." UTAH CONST, 
art. I, § 22. The harsh impact of the Ivers decision is that it improperly denies 
landowners, like Defendant/Petitioner Admiral Beverage Corporation ("Admiral"), the 
opportunity to recover the full measure of "just compensation," as required by Utah's 
constitution. In particular, the decision permits private property to be taken, damaged, 
and substantially impaired by the government, at the cost of unjustly denying the 
landowner the necessary recourse to be made whole for the injury caused by the 
government's action. The inequitable result of Ivers is wholly inconsistent and 
irreconcilable with Utah's constitutional mandate. 
It is undisputed that the 1-15 Project required the physical taking of Admiral's 
property and resulted in the substantial diminution of its value—all as a direct result of 
UDOT's construction of an elevated highway 28 feet above Admiral's property. (R. at 
181, 494-95). After the Ivers decision, Admiral is unable to recover all of the damages 
caused by the taking of its property and UDOT's construction of its project. The 
practical effect of Ivers is to impute into law precisely the result that the constitutional 
framers sought to reject and avoid. Utah's constitution as written clearly mandates that 
Admiral must receive "just compensation"—meaning that it must be compensated for 
all damages and be placed monetarily in the position it would have been in but-for the 
taking. Such a result is just; it is equitable; it is what was intended by the constitutional 
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framers; and it is consistent with what the constitution demands. Accordingly, Ivers must 
be overruled in order to restore Utah's eminent domain to what was intended by the 
constitutional framers and what the constitution clearly requires. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the single issue 
of "whether Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007), 
should be overruled on constitutional grounds." Order for Supp. Br. and Reh'g (June 23, 
2010). In its supplemental response brief, Plaintiff/Respondent Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT") has largely ignored the Court's directive and failed to provide 
any constitutionally-based rationale for either rejecting the arguments of Admiral or 
overruling the Ivers decision on the issue of loss of view. Specifically, UDOT failed to 
present any constitutional arguments in response to Admiral's supplemental brief. It also 
failed to provide a constitutional basis to support its assertion that the Ivers decision on 
loss of view should be overruled. 
UDOT also did not comply with the Court's Order in that it did not provide 
"supplemental" briefing in support of its argument to overrule Ivers on the issue of loss 
of visibility. Instead, UDOT simply cited Utah's prior case law and merely restated, 
almost verbatim, the arguments made in its brief to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Having failed to comply with the Court's Order, UDOTs arguments should be 
rejected and this Court should overrule Ivers on the issue of loss of visibility and uphold 
the decision on loss of view. 
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UDOT's arguments should also be rejected on substantive grounds. UDOT's 
arguments regarding Ivers are inconsistent with the express language of Utah's 
constitution and with the stated intention of the constitutional framers. UDOT's 
arguments are also in direct conflict with Utah case law as to what constitutes a "taking" 
and the measure of "just compensation" that must be paid when a taking occurs. Under a 
correct reading of Utah's constitution and case law, Ivers should be overruled on the 
issue of loss of visibility and should be upheld on the issue of loss of view. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UDOT's Response Ignores The Court's Directive And Fails To Present Any 
Constitutional Analysis Regarding The Ivers Decision. 
UDOT's response to Admiral's supplemental brief largely ignores the Supreme 
Court's Order requesting additional briefing on the constitutionality of Ivers, UDOT 
makes no effort to respond to or address Admiral's arguments regarding the significance 
of Utah's constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid when private 
property is "taken or damaged'' UTAH CONST, art. I, § 22. ("Private property shall not 
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."); City ofHildale v. 
Cooke, 2001 UT 56, Tj 18, 28 P.3d 697. In fact, other than its initial citation to Article I, 
Section 22 in its section entitled "Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and 
Rules" and passing references to the provision in cited cases, UDOT's brief only makes a 
single reference to Utah's constitution. Further, UDOT offers absolutely no discussion of 
the state's constitutionally-based requirement for just compensation, and makes no 
attempt to respond to the cases cited by Admiral, the plain language of Utah's 
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constitution, or its extensive legislative history. UDOT's lack of any constitutional 
discussion or argument is remarkable in light of the Supreme Court's mandate to the 
parties to provide briefing on the constitutionality of the Ivers case. 
A. UDOT Failed To Present Any Argument Or Discussion Regarding The 
Express Language Of Utah's Constitution. 
In its initial supplemental brief, Admiral focused the majority of its 46-page brief 
on the takings provision in Utah's constitution. Admiral detailed the significance of the 
inclusion of the term "or damaged" in the constitution, the historical backdrop of Utah's 
constitution, the legislative history and stated intention of the constitutional framers, and 
the extensive case law throughout Utah's history that has consistently given meaning to 
the state's eminent domain provisions. UDOT has made no attempt to respond to any of 
the constitutional arguments presented by Admiral and has instead merely restated its 
prior arguments, as if they would be given more weight if said a second time. 
UDOT ignored the express language of Utah's constitution, which requires an 
award of just compensation whenever property is "taken or damaged." UTAH CONST, 
art. I, § 22. UDOT also ignored the fact that Utah's eminent domain provision is distinct 
from other jurisdictions because it not only provides for the payment of "just 
compensation" where private property has been "taken," but it also affords payment of 
damages when the property has been "damaged." Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 
UT 37, Tf 13, 235 P.3d 730 ("because the Utah Constitution bounds the ability of the 
government not only to 'take[ ], ' but also to cdamage[ ],' private property, we have 
characterized this state constitutional provision as being broader than its federal 
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counterpart.") (omissions in original); Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 11 P. 849, 
852 (Utah 1904) (holding that Utah's constitutional guarantee of just compensation is 
triggered when there is "any substantial interference with private property which destroys 
or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is 
in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed") (emphasis added). 
B. UDOT Also Ignored Established Utah Case Law Regarding The Stated 
Purpose Of Article I, Section 22 And What Constitutes A "Taking" 
Under The State's Constitution. 
UDOT also failed to address the stated purpose of the constitutional provision, 
which "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to all whose property 
might thereafter be damaged." Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907) 
(finding it "manifest" that the landowners were "entitled to recover" damages suffered 
from the government's alteration of the street grade); see also Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 
120 P. 851, 853 (Utah 1912) ("Consequential damages to property which are caused by 
making public improvements are recoverable under the Constitution of this state ...."). 
Further, UDOT offered no response or counter to the clear statement under Utah 
law that Article I, Section 22 provides a broad definition of what types of governmental 
actions constitute a "taking" and require the payment of "just compensation." Strawberry 
Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996) (explaining that 
Article I, Section 22's "expansive language" has been interpreted to encompass "every 
species of property which the public needs may require, ... [including] legal and 
equitable rights of every description."). See also Stockdale v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 11 
P. 849, 852 (Utah 1904); see State ex rel State Rd. Comm 'n v. District Court, Fourth 
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JudicialDist, 78 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1937); Hampton v. State Rd Comm'n, 445 P.2d 
708, 711-12 (Utah 1968); Colman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d 622, 625-26 (Utah 
1990). Due to its failure to respond, UDOT has conceded the continuing validity of these 
long-standing legal principles. 
C. UDOT Made No Attempt To Respond To The Extensive Legislative 
History Behind Article I, Section 22 And The Clearly Stated Intention 
Of The Constitutional Framers To Include The Term "Or Damaged" 
In The Constitution. 
In addition to its failure to address the express language of Utah's constitution and 
the case law giving weight and meaning to the provision at issue, UDOT also failed to 
respond, address, or even mention the historical background and legislative history of 
Article I, Section 22. UDOT also made no response to the detailed history behind Utah's 
unique eminent domain provision and the significance of the framers * deliberate 
inclusion of the term "or damaged" in the state's constitution. Nor did UDOT attempt to 
address the constitutional framers5 insistence that Utah's constitution afford an adequate 
and just remedy and compensation for injuries caused to property as a result of public 
improvements. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, at 
326-37 (Day 22, Mar. 25, 1895) (Addendum Tab E to Admiral's Supp. Br. (Aug. 16, 
2010) (the intent of the term "or damaged'' in Utah's constitution was to make clear that 
landowners would be compensated for injuries resulting from the construction of public 
works projects, including the particular situation discussed during the Convention which 
involved the construction of an elevated roadway constructed near, but not on, the 
landowner's property that resulted in "the deprivation of light and air" and other 
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"necessary inconveniences" including "noise and soot and cinders, and disturbing the 
peace and rest of the family").) 
UDOT cannot legitimately ignore the extensive legislative history and express 
statements of the constitutional framers that a taking does in fact occur when damages 
and "inconveniences" result from the construction of an elevated highway on property 
other than the landowner's property. The constitutional framers specifically 
contemplated that a compensable "taking" would occur in such a situation, and they 
drafted Utah's constitution to include the term "or damaged" to ensure that it would. 
II. UDOT Also Does Not, And Cannot, Reconcile The Conflict In Utah Law 
Between The Constitutional Mandate To Award Just Compensation When 
Property Is Taken Or Damaged And The Holding In Ivers. 
Rather than focusing on any constitutionally-based arguments, UDOT argues that 
Admiral may not recover damages for loss of visibility on the grounds that there is no 
protected interest in the flow of traffic past its property. UDOT Supp. Br. at 8. In 
support of its argument, UDOT cites to a handful of cases, including Ivers—the very case 
which the Court is considering overturning. 
From the outset, the Court should reject UDOT's circular argument that the Ivers 
ruling on loss of visibility is unconstitutional based on the Ivers case itself. See UDOT 
Supp. Br. at 10-11. UDOT's citation to Ivers for the proposition that Utah has never 
recognized a claim for loss of visibility is improper and not logically sound when (1) no 
case before Ivers addressed the issue, and (2) this Court is questioning whether Ivers is 
constitutional. 
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Next, the cases cited by UDOT are inapposite and fail to reconcile the conflict in 
Utah's eminent domain law that on one hand requires just compensation when property is 
"damaged" or there is "any substantial interference . . . [that] destroys or materially 
lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any 
substantial degree abridged or destroyed" and on the other hand limits the availability of 
compensation awards when such damage and interference occurs. Compare UTAH 
CONST, art. I, § 22 and Stockdale, 11 P. at 852, with Ivers, 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802. 
UDOT argues that Admiral may not recover just compensation for the taking and damage 
caused to its property unless Admiral has a protected property interest. UDOT Supp. Br. 
at 8-14. Specifically, UDOT asserts that Admiral may not recover damages for loss of 
visibility because it does not have a protected interest in the flow of traffic past its 
property. UDOT's argument fails for several reasons. 
First, the suggestion that Admiral is claiming damages for changes in traffic 
patterns has no basis, because Admiral makes no claim based on the flow7 or pattern of 
traffic. Traffic flows have not increased or decreased, nor has the flow been impeded, 
interfered with or changed. Moreover, Admiral has no complaint over any changes in the 
route, direction or quantity of traffic resulting from UDOT's highway project. Instead, 
Admiral's damages are caused by the lost visibility of and view from its property, which 
are the direct result of the construction of an elevated highway and a twenty-eight foot 
tall support wall for the highway. 
Second, none of the cases cited by UDOT—other than the Ivers case, which is 
under constitutional scrutiny by the Court—correlates loss of visibility and view to traffic 
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flow. The case of Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, 235 P.3d 730, dealt 
with water rights and a landowner's interest in the "level of soil saturation." The case of 
Bagfordv. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (1995), dealt with whether oral agreements to 
provide garbage collection services constituted legally enforceable rights. Neither case 
dealt with traffic flows or loss of visibility. 
Additionally, the cases of Robinett v. Price, 14 Utah 512, 280 P. 736 (1929), State 
v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 276 (1941), and Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
Dist. v. Hislop, 12 Utah 2d 64, 362 P.2d 580 (1961), all cited by UDOT, dealt with an 
individual's own access to his property and the loss of business due to the rerouting of a 
roadway away from the landowner's property. The cases of Utah Rd. Comm 'n v. 
Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963), and Hampton v. State Rd Comm 'n, 21 
Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968), dealt with a landowner's loss of access to his 
property. Neither the diversion of traffic nor the loss of access are at issue in the present 
case. And none of the cases cited by UDOT, including Utah State Rd. Comm 'n v. Miya, 
526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974), and UtahDep'tofTransp. v. Harvey Real Estate, 
2002 UT 107, % 10, 57 P.3d 1088, dealt with the issue of loss of visibility. 
Third, UDOT's argument ignores the wealth of Utah case law that provides that a 
'taking" occurs under Utah's eminent domain laws whenever there is "any substantial 
interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or 
by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree 
abridged or destroyed." Stockdale, 11 P. at 852 (emphasis added). When there is 'any 
substantial interference" with the landowner's property that ''destroys or materially 
. 0 . 
lessens its value/' or when a landowner's right to the "use and enjoyment" of his property 
has "in any substantial degree" been impaired or destroyed—then there is "in fact and in 
law, a taking, in the constitutional sense." Id. (emphasis added). And when such a 
constitutional "taking" occurs, the landowner is entitled to just compensation "to the 
extent of the damages suffered," even in the situation where the title and possession of 
the owner remain undisturbed. Id. 
Fourth, Utah courts have similarly held that a compensable "taking" occurs when 
a landowner establishes that his property has been substantially impaired or damaged as a 
"direct and necessary consequence of the construction or operation of a public use," 
thereby entitling the landowner to just compensation. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. 
v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244-45 (Utah 1990) (holding that "[t]he diminution of 
value and cost of repairs to the mall which [landowner] alleged constitute damages within 
the guarantee of article I, section 22."); Utah State Rd. Comm 'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 
928 (Utah 1974) ("Just compensation is due if the market value of the property has 
diminished."). See also Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^ j 29 & 
n.l 1, 42 P.3d 379 (remanding case for factual determination of whether "the damage was 
indeed for a public use and then whether the damage necessarily resulted from that use"). 
UDOT has made no attempt to reconcile these cases with Ivers. 
III. If The Supreme Court Were To Accept UDOT's Argument, Admiral Would 
Be Denied The Full Measure Of Just Compensation Guaranteed By Utah's 
Constitution. 
The term "just compensation," as it has been interpreted by Utah courts, means 
"that the owners must be put in as good a position money wise as they would have 
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occupied had their property not been taken." State v. Noble, 305 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 
1957). The constitutional mandate of just compensation derives "as much content from 
the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property 
law." Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) (quoting 
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488? 490 (1973)). In order for compensation to be fair 
and just as required by Utah's Constitution, "it must reflect the fair value of the land to 
the landowner[,]" and must make the landowner whole in a monetary sense and place 
him back in the position he would have occupied were his property not taken and the 
government's project not constructed. Friberg, 687 P.2d at 828 (citing Noble, 305 P.2d 
at 497). 
UDOT's argument that there is no compensable damage for loss of visibility and 
view undermines the fundamental concept of just compensation and denies the landowner 
the right to be made whole. Under UDOT's argument, a landowner would not be made 
whole and would not be placed in as good a position monetarily as he would have 
occupied had his property not been involuntarily taken. This is far short of what is 
required by Utah's constitution and what constitutes "just compensation" under Utah law. 
To properly determine the fair market value of the affected property—and 
correspondingly the amount of just compensation owed—requires "that all factors 
bearing upon such value that any prudent purchaser would take into account at [the time 
of the taking] should be given consideration, including any potential development in the 
area reasonably to be expected." Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Ward, 347 
P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1959). See also Morris v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 102 P. 629, 
- 1 1 -
631 (Utah 1909) (holding that "everything which arises out of the proper construction and 
proper operation of the [public improvement] which directly affects the salable value of 
the abutting property may ordinarily be considered as elements in assessing damages") 
(emphasis added); Carpet Bam v. State, 786 P.2d 770, 773-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(applying before-and-after valuation method as the proper method of determining 
damages). 
The policy behind a broad interpretation of just compensation awards under a 
"taken or damaged" constitutional provision like Utah's is to allow recovery for all 
consequential damages caused by public improvements, thereby ensuring that the 
"burdens for such damages are distributed among all the taxpayers" where previously 
they disproportionately "fell upon those only who sustained the injury." Kimball v. Salt 
Lake City, 90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907). As recognized in Kimball in 1907, Utah's 
constitutional provision "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to all 
whose property might thereafter be damaged." Id. In Kimball, the court found it 
"manifest" that the landowners were "entitled to recover" damages suffered from the 
government's alteration of the street grade. Id. Thus, under Utah's constitution, "the 
party whose property is injuriously affected by any change of grade may recover 
damages against the [governmental entity] for the diminution of the market value of his 
property to the extent that such diminution exceeds the direct benefits derived from the 
improvements causing the damage." Id. at 396. 
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IV. The Ivers Ruling On Loss Of View Is Constitutional, And UDOT Has 
Provided No Constitutional Basis For Overruling This Court's Decision. 
In its supplemental response brief, UDOT argues that the Ivers rule on loss of 
view should be overruled. However, it has failed to comply with the Court's Order to 
provide "supplemental" briefing on whether Ivers should be overruled on "constitutional" 
grounds. Order for Supp. Br. and Reh'g. UDOT has not provided any constitutional 
basis for overruling Ivers, as requested by this Court. Nor has UDOT provided any 
"supplemental" briefing; it has only quoted Ivers and cases cited therein, as well as the 
district court's decision in the present case (see UDOT Supp. Br. at 14-16). In doing so, 
it has merely restated its prior argument from its briefing before the Utah Court of 
Appeals (compare id. at 17-20 with UDOT Ct. App. Br. at 8-11). Having presented no 
constitutional basis for overruling Ivers or any new arguments that have not been 
previously made by UDOT, UDOT's arguments should be rejected. 
A. The Supreme Court In Ivers Did Not Err In Its Ruling Allowing 
Damages For Loss Of View. 
UDOT argues that this Court erred in ruling that a landowner is entitled to 
damages for loss of view—regardless of where the view-impairing structure is 
constructed—when the property taken is essential to the completion of the project. 
UDOT Br. at 14-16. Contrary to UDOT's assertion, the Court's ruling on loss of view 
squarely comports with Utah's constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid 
for the taking or damage of private property. 
Prior to the Court's ruling in Ivers, Utah law permitted the award of severance 
damages for loss of view when private property was taken for public purposes and a 
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view-impairing structure was built on the property taken. Ivers v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 
2007 UT 1 9 4 20, 154 P.3d 802, 807 (citing Utah State Rd Comm Jn v. Miya, 526 P.2d 
926 (Utah 1974); Utah Dep %t of Tramp, v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107. 57 P.3d 
1088 and Utah Dep 7 ofTransp. v. D'Ambriosio, 743 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1987)). The Court 
in Ivers saw the inequities of the prior rule which would have denied damages to Ivers 
where the structure that blocked Ivers's view was built on property other than the 
property taken. Ivers, 2007 UT 19, ^ f 17. In rendering its decision, the Court in Ivers 
reasoned that "[l]ogically, if the project could not be built without taking the condemned 
land, the impairment of view caused by the completion of the project could and would 
not have arisen wbut for' the condemnation." Id. at f 21. Thus, in order to provide "the 
correct balance between the property owner's rights under constitutional and statutory 
law and the state's interest in its ability to improve the highway system without being 
exposed to limitless liability," the Court appropriately expanded its prior ruling to allow 
for severance damages for loss of view without regard to the location of the view-
impairing structure, where the property taken is essential to the highway project. Id. at 
11121-24. 
The Court's ruling on loss of view is in complete accord with the constitutional 
requirement that just compensation be paid when private property is "taken or damaged." 
By affording a landowner to recover damages for impacts caused as a result of the project 
being constructed, the Court in Ivers provided for a more appropriate measure of just 
compensation that is squarely in line with the cases that hold that a compensable "taking" 
occurs when there has been "substantial interference" with or impairment to the 
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landowner's property that results in a material decrease in its value or a reduction in the 
landowner's ability to use or enjoy it. Colman v. Utah State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622, 
625-27 (Utah 1990). See also Stockdale, 11 P. at 852. The ruling also afforded 
landowners a greater opportunity to be "put in as good a position money wise as they 
would have occupied had their property not been taken." Friberg, 687 P.2d at 828. 
Accordingly, the Ivers decision on loss of view is constitutional, and UDOT has not 
provided any compelling argument to the contrary. 
B. Contrary To UDOT's Suggestion, Admiral's Remainder Property Does 
Abut The Property Taken By UDOT As Part Of Its 1-15 Project And 
The Taking Of Admiral's Property Was An Essential Part Of That 
Project. 
UDOT next argues that Admiral's property does not abut 1-15 and therefore the 
"abutment rule"—as described by UDOT—does not apply to this case. UDOT's 
arguments on this issue are identical to those presented to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
UDOT has not provided any new or supplemental arguments on this issue. 
Additionally, UDOT's assertion that it is irrelevant that UDOT has taken 
Admiral's property as part of its 1-15 reconstruction project directly undermines the most 
fundamental concepts of Utah's eminent domain laws—the concept of "just 
compensation." It is undisputed that Admiral's property was necessary and essential to 
UDOT's highway project and that UDOT could not have completed the project without 
Admiral's property. Therefore, Admiral is entitled to receive "just compensation," 
meaning that it should be "put in as good a position money wise as they would have 
occupied had their property not been taken." Noble, 305 P.2d at 497; Friberg, 687 P.2d 
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at 828 ("[t]he constitutional requirement of just compensation derives 'as much content 
from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of 
property law/ when the State takes private property for the public welfare"9 and that for 
compensation to be fair and just as required by Utah's Constitution. uit must reflect the 
fair value of the land to the landowner/' and make the landowner whole in a monetary 
sense). UDOT's suggestion that Admiral should not receive the full measure of 
compensation resulting from UDOFs taking is contrary to the fundamental protections 
required under Utah law. 
Furthermore, UDOT's argument is factually inaccurate. Admiral's property was 
taken as part of the 1-15 project. And while the specific portion of the project constructed 
on Admiral's property was the relocation of 500 West, the property taken was used by 
UDOT to construct its 1-15 project in the manner it proposed and was an essential part of 
the project. Accordingly, Admiral's property does in fact abut the project and UDOT's 
argument to the contrary is without factual support. 
CONCLUSION 
Admiral respectfully request the Court overrule its prior decision in Ivers v. Utah 
Department of Transportation, 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, and permit damage awards in 
condemnation actions for loss of visibility. UDOT has failed to provide any 
constitutionally-based argument that such a result is not appropriate or warranted under 
Utah's constitution. Additionally, UDOT failed to comply with the Court's Order 
requiring "supplemental" briefing. Instead, UDOT cited to prior case law and merely 
restated the arguments it previously presented to the Utah Court of Appeals. Having 
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failed to comply with the Court's Order, UDOT's arguments should be rejected and this 
Court should overrule Ivers on the issue of loss of visibility and uphold the decision on 
loss of view. 
Additionally, UDOT's arguments should also be rejected on substantive grounds. 
UDOT's arguments regarding Ivers are inconsistent with the express language of Utah's 
constitution, the stated intention of the constitutional framers, and the wealth of Utah case 
law governing when a "taking" occurs and the measure of "just compensation" that must 
be paid. Under a correct reading of Utah's constitution and case law, Ivers should be 
overruled on the issue of loss of visibility and should be upheld on the issue of loss of 
view. By overruling Ivers, the Court will be returning Utah's eminent domain 
jurisprudence to its proper and intended course—one that adheres to the clear mandate of 
Utah's constitution. 
Dated this 29th day of October, 2010. 
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Attorftgys for Defendant/Petitioner 
Admiral Beverage Corporation 
-17-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 29th day of October, 2010,1 caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT/PETITIONER to be mailed to the following: 
Brent A. Burnett 
Assistant Attorney General 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Donald J. Winder 
John W. Holt 
Winder & Counsel, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, #4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for the James Ivers, Kathleen Havas and P&F Food Services 
mu 
4934651 2 DOC 
-18-
